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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRENDA J. MARSHALL, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 20040457-CA 
O. STEWART PIERCE, 
) 
Defendant and Appellee. 
) 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-
2(3)0) and(4) and Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UCA. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
A. ISSUE: IS THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS 
CASE THAT PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES RESULTING FROM THE AUTOMOBILE 
COLLISION WERE PERMANENT? (Point 1) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The 
standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard as being against the clear weight of 
the evidence. Rule 52(a) URCP and Young v. Young , 979 P2d 338 (Utah 1999). This 
error was preserved in the lower court by Motion for New Trial (R. 269-270) and 
Memorandum Opposing Judgment of No Cause of Action. (R. 289, 292-298, 365:18). 
B. ISSUE: DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE PERMANENT INJURIES BASED ON OBJECTIVE 
FINDINGS? (Point 2) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The 
lower court found that there is no objective test for myofascial pain, and thus the issue is 
the meaning of the term "objective findings" which is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness with no deference given to the determination of the lower court. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Error was preserved by Motion for New Trial (R. 269-
270) and by Memorandum Opposing No Cause of Action Judgment (R. 289, 292-298). 
C. ISSUE: DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE 
GENERAL DAMAGES? (Point 3) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The 
standard of review is that the appellate court reviews the action of the lower court and 
reverses only if there is no reasonable basis to support that action. Crookstonv. Fire Ins. 
Exch.. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). The lower court shall grant a new trial if it appears that 
the verdict was inadequate appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, or under a misunderstanding of the facts or law or such is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. Saltas v. Affleck. 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940), Chatelain 
v. Thackeray. 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 191 (1940) and Crookston. supra. This error was 
preserved by Motion for New Trail. (R.269-270,273) 
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D. ISSUE: DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE 
SPECIAL DAMAGES? (Point 4) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The 
standard of review is that the appellate court reviews the action of the lower court and 
reverses only if there is no reasonable basis to support that action. Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch.. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). The lower court shall grant a new trial if it appears that 
the verdict was inadequate appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, or under a misunderstanding of the facts or law or such is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. Saltas v. Affleck, supra. Chatelain v. Thackeray, supra and 
Crookston. supra. This error was preserved by Motion for New Trial. (R. 269-270, 279) 
E. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 15 AND 11, RELATING TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROBABLE LIFE EXPECTANCY, AGGRAVATION OF PRE-EXISTING INJURY 
AND LEFT TURNS IN THE FACE OF ONCOMING TRAFFIC? (Point 5A, 5B and 
5C) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: 
Reviewed for correctness with no deference to lower court. State v. Pena. supra. Error 
preserved when court refused to give Plaintiffs Requested Instructions 16 ( R.134), 15 
( R. 133) and 11 ( R. 129) as part of instructions given to the jury ( R. 185-222) 
and by plaintiffs Motion for New Trial. (R.269-270, 280-283) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
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Section 31 A-22-309(l)(a) UCA: 
A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause 
of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to 
have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has 
sustained one or more of the following: 
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective 
findings; 
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
Section 49-21-401(6) UCA: 
"'Objective medical impairment1 means an impairment resulting from an 
injury or illness which is diagnosed by a physician and which is based on 
accepted objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective 
complaints." 
Section 41-6-73 UCA: 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-of-
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is so 
close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
Rule 49(a), URCP (Relevant portion): 
"...If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or 
by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so 
omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. 
As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a finding; 
or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord 
with the judgment on the special verdict." 
Rule 201(d), Utah Rules of Evidence: 
"When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party 
and supplied with the necessary information." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
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This is an action in which plaintiff seeks damages for defendant's 
negligence proximately causing an automobile collision between plaintiff and defendant 
resulting in personal injuries to plaintiff. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The case was tried to a jury who returned a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant 
made a motion for judgment of no cause of action alleging that plaintiff had not proved 
permanent injuries nor met the $3,000 personal injury threshold as provided in Section 
31 A-22-309(l)(a) UCA (R 232-233). The lower court granted said motion (R. 318-
320). Plaintiff made a motion for a new trial (R. 269-270) which was denied, and as part 
of the order of denial, the lower court made four findings of fact ( R.348-350). Plaintiff 
timely appealed the said judgment and the order denying motion for new trail in their 
entirety. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered a judgment of no cause of action, and denied 
plaintiffs motion for a new trial, and as part of said order denying plaintiffs motion for a 
new trial made four findings of fact. Plaintiff timely appealed from the said judgment and 
from the order denying motion for a new trial in their entirety. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This is an action for damages sustained by plaintiff in an automobile 
collision which occurred on September 19, 1998. Plaintiff was traveling South on State 
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Street at or about the intersection of State Street and Creek Road and going 40 mph at the 
time of the collision. (Tr. 363: 76). Defendant was traveling in the opposite direction and 
stopped to turn left and then proceeded in a westerly direction. Southbound traffic in the 
inside lane stopped to allow defendant to turn left. Defendant turned left across the lane 
where traffic had stopped, but proceeded into the outside lane in which plaintiffs car was 
traveling without yielding to plaintiff and collided with plaintiffs car. (Tr. 363: 74-78) 
Damages to plaintiffs vehicle were approx. $2,000.00. (Tr. 363: 69) 
2. Plaintiff sustained injuries to her back. Plaintiff had sustained two prior 
on-the-job injuries to her back that year, but had substantially recovered from them at the 
time of this automobile collision. (Tr. 363: 74 and 162) 
3. The action was tried to a jury on January 7, and 8, 2004. The jury 
returned a verdict in which the jury found: 
A. That defendant was negligent. 
B. That such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff s 
injuries. Fault apportioned to defendant was 90%. 
C. The plaintiff was awarded special damages of $2,100.00. 
D. Plaintiff was awarded no amount for future specials. 
E. Plaintiff was awarded $2,200 for general damages. ( R. 223-224) 
4. Three expert witnesses were called as witnesses to the injuries sustained 
by plaintiff, Dr. David Petron, Dr. Joel Dall, and Dr. Jeffrey Chung. Dr. Dallfs testimony 
was that plaintiffs injuries were permanent (Tr. 364: 187-189). Dr. Chung, defendants 
expert, stated clearly that plaintiff was not going to get better (Ex. C pages 12-14, Ex. C 
Supplemental Report page 2). Dr. Petron testified that in his opinion plaintiff injuries 
6 
from the collision were permanent (Ex. 2, last page), and that plaintiff would have 
completely recovered from her previous injuries but for the auto collision (Tr. 363: 172). 
Dr. Dall testified that the auto collision caused her permanent injuries (Tr.364: 187-189). 
Dr. Chung on the other hand testified that the auto collision was 30 % responsible for her 
permanent injuries or in the alternative that the injuries sustained by plaintiff in the 
automobile collision were only temporary (Ex. C and Tr. 364: 233-237 and 251). Dr. 
Chung further testified that in his opinion the treatment plaintiff received from the time of 
the auto collision in September through the end of 1998 was necessitated by the auto 
collision (Tr.364: 233-237). 
5. The uncontradicted testimony at the trial was that plaintiffs special 
damages incurred after the automobile collision were $6,305.37. (Exhibits 4, 5, 7, 9 and 
10). 
6. Defendant made a post-trial motion for entry of judgment of no cause of 
action (R. 232-233). That motion was briefed by the parties, but granted without oral 
argument (R. 318-320). 
7. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, which was briefed by the parties and 
argued orally to the court. At the conclusion of such argument, the court denied the 
motion, and as part of the order denying said motion made "findings of fact" pursuant to 
Rule 49(a) URCP as follows which are set forth in full in Point 2 hereafter. 
Other facts are set forth in the body of the arguments relating thereto. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE 
IS THAT PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES RESULTING FROM THE AUTOMOBILE 
COLLISION WERE PERMANENT. 
The main issue in this case is whether plaintiffs injuries were permanent 
or only temporary. If permanent, then the verdict of the jury in this action of $2,200 
general damages for a lifetime of pain and suffering is clearly insufficient. Furthermore, 
even that small award was taken from plaintiff because the lower court ruled that plaintiff 
had failed to prove that the injuries received in the automobile collision were permanent. 
Plaintiff has marshaled the evidence supporting a finding of temporary 
injury. The only such evidence came from defendant's expert, Dr. Jeff B. Chung, an 
orthopedic specialist. Dr. Chung in oral testimony advanced two alternate theories which 
he likened to a glass Vi full or a glass lA empty. He said is was reasonable to view the 
injuries sustained by plaintiff in the automobile collision as being merely a temporary 
exacerbation of a pre-existing injury. He said it was also reasonable to view plaintiffs 
injuries as being permanent in nature and caused 30 % by the automobile collision and 70 
% by other unrelated injuries. Dr. Chung testified that it is impossible to know which 
version is correct, and that he has no preference. Dr. Chung's prior written report does not 
mention the temporary injury theory. 
Plaintiff argues that this is not a medical opinion upon which a judge or jury 
can find temporary injuries. What Dr. Chung said was that the injuries are temporary or 
8 
they are permanent. The jury knows that much without Dr. Chung's testimony. All his 
testimony does no more than invite the jury to speculate. 
On the other hand in this point we summarize the evidence in favor of a 
finding of permanent injury, including Dr. Chung's own testimony on the permanent 
nature of plaintiff s injuries, and the testimony of plaintiff s orthopedic experts, Dr. Joel 
T. Dall and Dr. David J. Petron. Dr. Dall's testimony was that the plaintiffs injuries were 
caused by the automobile collision and that they were permanent. Dr. Petron's opinion 
was that plaintiffs condition "will likely persist" and that but for the automobile collision, 
plaintiff would have fully recovered from her prior injuries. The clear weight of the 
evidence is that plaintiffs injuries from the automobile collision were permanent. 
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO PROVE PERMANENT INJURIES BASED ON OBJECTIVE FINDINGS. 
All of the experts were of the opinion that plaintiffs pain was caused by 
myofascial injuries. The court made a finding that such injuries cannot be established by 
"objective findings," and that plaintiff had failed to meet the threshold requirement of 
Section 31A-22-3 09(1 )(a) UCA requiring proof of permanent injury based upon 
"objective" findings. In reaching this determination, the court probably relied upon 
testimony at trial by Dr. Chung that any finding which was contributed to by the patient or 
over which the patient had any control was subjective and not objective. 
Plaintiff believes that the meaning of the term "objective findings" is that 
such findings not be based only on what the patient says, but rather a finding is objective 
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if it is the result of the physician's own examination and is the kind finding which a 
physician relies on to prescribe treatment. Such a finding does not lose its "objectivity" 
just because a patient has in some way contributed to it. Finally, the permanent nature of 
plaintiffs injuries from the automobile collision are repeatedly established, recorded and 
reported by all three experts through their own "objective" examinations. 
POINT 3 . THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE 
GENERAL DAMAGES. 
In Point 3, plaintiff argues that the decision of the lower court not to grant 
plaintiff a new trial appears clearly to have been largely based upon the courts erroneous 
belief that plaintiffs injuries from the automobile collision were only temporary, and in 
any event not capable of any proof by objective findings. We argue in Points 1 and 2 
above that these conclusions of the lower court are erroneous, and therefor the failure to 
grant a new trail is really an issue of law reviewed for correctness, and that if plaintiff is 
correct that the clear weight of the evidence is that plaintiff injuries from the automobile 
collision were permanent as shown by objective findings, then the jury verdict is clearly 
inadequate appearing to have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice, and 
further it appears clearly that the jury misconceived the evidence and the law, and that 
their verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. In addition, the lower court 
found that the jury had believed Dr. Chung's temporary injury argument, and the lower 
court itself felt such temporary injury theory to be established by the weight of the 
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evidence. Plaintiff argues that the lower court is in error on both counts, and that there is 
no reasonable basis to support the lower court's denial of plaintiff s motion for a new trial. 
POINT 4. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE 
SPECIAL DAMAGES. 
The jury awarded $2,100 in special damages and nothing for future specials. 
Plaintiff argues that a new trial should have been granted for the same reasons as set out in 
Point 1 because of the inadequacy of the jury's award of special damages and because of 
lack of any award for future specials. The parties stipulated that the special damages 
incurred by plaintiff after the motor vehicle accident were $6,305.37. The only testimony 
on future specials was that of Dr. Dall who testified that future specials would probably be 
incurred about the same as in the past. Plaintiff argues that there is no basis for 
apportioning the medical expenses incurred by plaintiff after the accident between the 
various episodes of injury. There is no way the jury could say that a certain bill is incurred 
because of plaintiff s first lifting injury, or because of her second lifting injury. A medical 
consultation or medication is required by plaintiff for her entire condition which is one 
condition. Plaintiff argues that under Utah law, if apportionment is not possible, the 
defendant is responsible for all medical expenses incurred. 
Plaintiff further argues that even defendant's expert Dr. Chung testified that 
all expenses incurred from the time of the subject motor vehicle collision to December 18, 
1998, were incurred because of that collision and this amount plus even 30% of the bills 
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incurred thereafter to date of trial amounted to at least $3,190.30. No less than that amount 
should have been awarded by the jury, and that amount alone would have precluded 
dismissing this case for failure to meet the threshold under Section 31A-22-309(1 )(a) UCA. 
POINT 5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 15 AND 11. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16 RELATING TO 
PLAINTIFF'S PROBABLE LIFE EXPECTANCY. 
Plaintiff argues that the court should have given Plaintiffs Requested 
Instruction No. 16 which would have instructed the jury that plaintiffs life expectancy was 
25.3 years. Plaintiff was entitled to that instruction so that the jury would know how many 
years of suffering plaintiff would likely have to endure because of her permanent injuries. 
Plaintiffs requested instruction was in proper form and was based upon the table in Am Jur 
2nd Desk Book, which was a reliable and accepted source therefore, and failure to give this 
instruction was prejudicial error. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 15 RELATING TO 
AGGRAVATION OF PREEXISTING INJURY. 
Plaintiff argues that the court erred in not giving Plaintiffs Requested 
Instruction No. 15 relating to pre-existing injuries which have become substantially 
asymptomatic. Plaintiff s Requested Instruction No. 15 was based upon MUJI 27.7. The 
instruction given was based on MUJI 27.6. The difference is that under 27.7 the tortfeasor 
who aggravates a preexisting condition which is dormant or asymptomatic is responsible 
for all of the ensuing pain, whereas under 27.6, the tortfeasor is only liable for the pain the 
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is attributable to the later injury. Whether plaintiff had substantially recovered from her 
prior injures was a disputed issue of fact. Plaintiff claimed that she had so recovered and 
the testimony of plaintiff s experts supported her position, whereas defendant argued that 
she had not substantially so recovered. Nevertheless, plaintiff was entitled to have the law 
governing her theory of the case (which was supported by substantial, competent evidence) 
given to the jury. This was not done and constitutes prejudicial error. 
C. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 RELATING TO 
LEFT TURNS IN THE FACE OF ONCOMING TRAFFIC. 
The lower court refused to give Plaintiffs Requested Instruction No 11 in 
full. The court gave the first portion thereof, but refused to give the part where the jury 
would have been instructed that where a party is turning left and the traffic in one lane 
stops to allow that person to turn left, that fact does not give such left-turning driver the 
right to expect that other lanes will so yield nor remove such driver's duty to yield to traffic 
in such other lanes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS 
THAT PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES RESULTING FROM THE AUTOMOBILE 
COLLISION WERE PERMANENT. 
The principal issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs injuries from the 
automobile collision were permanent or only temporary. Plaintiff believes this 
determination is crucial for two reasons. First, if plaintiff s said injuries were permanent 
than the jury award of $2,200 for general damages would appear to be inadequate and 
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given under the influence of passion or prejudice; or the evidence was insufficient to 
justify such verdict; or the jury misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts; or 
misunderstood or disregarded the law; or their verdict was clearly against the weight of the 
evidence. Second, even the small jury award of $2,200 was taken from plaintiff by the 
court because the court found that plaintiffs said injuries were only temporary. 
Plaintiff submits that the clear weight of the evidence is this case is that 
plaintiffs injuries resulting from the automobile collision were permanent. 
Plaintiff begins her consideration of this issue by marshaling all evidence in 
the record which supports the conclusion that plaintiffs injuries were only temporary. This 
is followed by plaintiffs discussion of that evidence. There follows then a summary of all 
of the evidence tending to show that plaintiffs injuries from the automobile accident were 
permanent. That summary is again followed by plaintiffs discussion of that evidence. 
MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTING A FINDING OF TEMPORARY 
INJURY: 
The only testimony that plaintiffs injuries from the automobile collision were 
temporary came from Dr. Chung. In his written report admitted in evidence as Ex. C, Dr. 
Chung concluded that the episode of 1-30-98, the episode of August 1998 and the 
automobile collision of 9-18-98 were equally the cause of plaintiff s permanent injuries. 
At the trial he does not repudiate that conclusion, but does quantify it by testifying that the 
said three episodes in 1998 were each 30% responsible for plaintiffs injuries and that the 
episode in May of 1999 was 10% responsible therefor. Dr. Chung goes on however to state 
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for the first time his other "alterative" that the injuries from the automobile collision were 
only temporary. 
The record in that regard is set forth at pages Tr. 364: 233 - 237 on direct examination by 
Mr. Burt: 
Q Now Doctor, let me just get to the issue at hand. Have you formed an 
opinion in this case about what treatment Mr.[sic!] Marshall received was 
related to the motor vehicle accident? 
A Yes. 
Q And is that opinion based upon information that is reasonably relied upon 
by experts in your field? 
AI believe so, yes. 
Q And can you state that opinion to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability? 
A Yes. 
Q In other words, more likely than not standard. 
A Yes. 
Q And what is that opinion? 
A My opinion is this. Ms. Marshall was fragile. She had pre-existing 
myofascial tender points and trigger points effecting her spine from her 
shoulder down to her low back, starting in January of 1998 and still requiring 
treatment through September of 1998. This car accident did not help things. 
It flared it up - flared up her symptoms. Looking through the medical records 
where she received treatment, it appears that the treatment she received from 
September 22nd of 1998 extending through December 17th of 1998 was 
directly related to that car accident. 
Q Okay, what about the treatment receive in 1999, 2000 and 2003, do you 
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have an opinion about whether that treatment is related to the motor vehicle 
accident? 
A What I can tell you is that there's a four month break between December 
17th-
Mr. Madsen: Again-
THE WITNESS: There's a four month break between December 1998 and 
resumption of care in April of 1999. Although it's possible that the treatment 
after December of 1998 is related to that accident, I don't think it's likely. 
Q Okay, why is that? 
A Well, if you look at a nine month flow chart of Ms. Marshall's treatment, 
even if the motor vehicle accident had not occurred, you would've been able 
to expect that she would have periodic flares, flare ups of her pain, that 
require treatment with or without injury. If you look at the treatment that Ms. 
Marshall received in 2000, March of 2000 with Dr. Petron, October of 2000 
with Dr. Petron, she didn't really have an injury. You know, she just had a 
flare up of symptoms when she saw him. In May of 1999 she had a flare up 
because of the type of work she does so even if this car accident never 
happened, given that she's had nine months of symptoms from January of 
1998 to September of 1998,1 think most physicians would have expected her 
to have periodic flare ups and intermediate treatment regardless of this car 
accident. 
Q So as a result of the - and let me just make sure I understand that. As a 
result of the injuries sustained earlier in 1998, those two prior injuries -
A Right. 
Q You testimony is that it's more likely than not she would've had periodic 
flare ups of those conditions with or without the motor vehicle accident. 
A Yes. Now, it's my opinion that this motor vehicle didn't help things, 
obviously. 
Q Okay. 
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A And that it probably flared up symptoms and required treatment. Now 
there's two ways of looking at the glass that's half full, you look at it as half 
empty or half full. You look at this car accident as being something that 
flared up something temporarily and went back to baseline, or you could say 
there's four accidents. Okay, three of those accidents appeared about equal. 
The accident of January 30th, 1998, the accident at work in August of 1998, 
the motor vehicle accident in September of 1998, and then those seem - those 
accidents all required about the same amount of treatments and seemed to be 
about as intense. The last accident of May 1999 seemed to be least intense 
and required the least amount of treatment. So if you look at just the number 
of injuries, you could say, alright, let's apportion 30 percent of the first 
accident, 30 percent in second accident, and 30 percent the third accident, and 
10 percent to the last accident, because there's four accidents, of which the 
last accident is the last [sic!] significant. If you look at that, I think that's a 
reasonable way to look at it. Or you could look at this motor vehicle accident 
as one in a series of flare ups. Okay, that really didn't change anything long-
term. Okay? 
These are two reasonable ways of looking at it. There's no way to say which 
version is right or wrong. Okay, it's just like looking at a glass half full or 
half empty. So I think those are two basically reasonable ways of looking at 
it, and I don't really have a strong preference one way or the other. 
Q Okay, then just let me re-state. So your opinions are that you can look at 
this on a continuum, and in that you could - you could look at the history of 
1998 and say that she was going along and had treatment, then had pain, and 
was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sustained an exacerbation of 
that pre-existing condition, for which the care between September and 
December would be related to the accident. 
A Yes. 
Q (BY MR. BURT) And the second alternative, Dr. Chung, would be that 
you could look at the four events. Your opinion is that the first three events, 
January 30th, August 14th, and September 18th of 1998, were all about the 
same in terms of severity, and that fourth event in May, 1999, was probably 
the least severe because it didn't require as much treatment at that time. 
A Yes. 
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Q So you would apportion it 30, 30, 30 and 10. 
A Yes. 
Tr. 364: 238 and 239 on direct examination by Mr. Burt: 
Q Alright. Now Dr. Chung, have you formed any opinions in this case about 
whether this patient needs future medical care related to the motor vehicle 
accident: 
A Yes. 
Q And is that opinion, or are those opinions based upon a reasonable degree 
of medical probability? 
A Yes. 
Q And there were based upon the type of information reasonably relied upon 
by experts in the field" 
A Yes. 
Q Okay, what are those opinions? 
A Well, first there's a difference between what's necessary and what's 
reasonable Okay? Food and shelter is necessary. Okay, but it's reasonable to 
have a little bit more than that. And so, is any more treatment necessary: NO. 
But is getting a physical therapy visit and an occasional trigger point injection 
reasonable? Yeah. Bottom line is that there's no cure for what Ms. Marshall 
has besides encouraging her to exercise, to be as fit as possible, to understand 
that when she experiences muscular pain of this sort that the best think is to 
decrease activity and work through the symptoms rather than restrict activity. 
Q So with regard to future medical care being related to the motor vehicle 
accident, what is your opinion about whether she'll need care related to the 
accident -
AI don't think further care is not -1 don't think further care is necessary. I 
expect that Ms. Marshall will have periodic flare ups of pain, and if she wants 
to go see a doctor and get some palliative treatment, I don't see anything 
18 
wrong with that. Blaming it all on a motor vehicle accident that is just one of 
four accidents, and blaming that treatment on a condition that most likely 
would be exactly the same even if that accident had not occurred, to me 
doesn't seem completely fair. 
Tr. 364: 251 on cross-examination by Mr. Madsen: 
Q And therefore, isn't it true that you try to get as - that you put your 
maximum medical improvement - and if, in fact, you were the treating 
physician, and said, I believe she was constantly recovering, constantly 
improving May through September 16th, 1998, and but for the accident on the 
18th, she would have recovered to MMI? 
A I don't think that you could say that in a reasonable fashion. 
Q You don't believe in the treating physician can make that kind of an 
opinion? 
A I believe -1 believe a treating physician can give any sort of opinion he 
wants if he truly believes in it, but you look at her history over nine months, 
and you look at her periodic flare ups, I don't think that you could say that if 
it wasn't for this accident that Ms. Marshall would've been completely cured. 
I believe you could say that Ms. Marshall does work that's strenuous, okay -
Q You're trying to convince the jury that she would've been essentially the 
same today if there hadn't been a motor vehicle accident? 
A Yes, I think I've made it clear -
Q That's what you're trying to say, that accident would just cause none of her 
symptoms, none of the reason for Dr. Dall's treatment or for Dr. Patron's 
treatment after September 19th, 1998, is that your testimony? 
A If you'd let me answer, I -
Q Well, I (inaudible). 
(Both talking) 
A I believe there are two ways of looking at this. I believe that you can look 
at four separate accidents, and you can portion the first group in 30, 30 ,30, 
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and 10 to the last one, or I could look at this as a continuum of this accident 
(inaudible) symptoms, worse than they should've been, and then going back 
to baseline and being exactly the same as before. Either way is a reasonable 
way of looking at it. There's no way to scientifically say one way of looking 
at it is better than the other. That's what I'm trying to say. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that although the analogy is correct - that a glass 
half-full is by definition also half-empty, that is not true of Dr. Chung's alternatives - they 
are by no means equivalents. In the first alternative, the auto collision was 30 % 
responsible for a permanent, non-curable condition. The second is that the auto accident 
only caused a temporary flare-up. How can those two alternatives be viewed as the same 
thing? What Dr. Chung is saying is that the auto collision caused 30% of a permanent 
condition or the auto collision only caused temporary injuries. In other words the result of 
the auto collision was permanent injury or temporary injury. To say that an injury is 
permanent or temporary is no opinion at all. Anyone off the street could say as much. To 
say as Dr. Chung did that "There is no way to say which version is right or wrong" or that 
"he has no preference" further neutralizes his "opinion." At best Dr. Chung is saying he 
doesn't know if it is permanent or temporary, and it is a matter of indifference to him. In all 
events Dr. Chung's two alternatives are totally incompatible, and the result of his testimony 
is that he has given no opinion with reasonable medical certainty nor an opinion which aids 
the jury in their task. The jury knows coming into this case that the injuries are permanent 
or temporary. They know no more after Dr. Chung's testimony. His testimony does no 
more than to leave them to speculate - in effect to flip a coin to see if plaintiffs injuries are 
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permanent or temporary. This is no evidence upon which a jury or the court can make a 
finding of temporary injury. 
Dr. Chung never mentions this alternative theory in his written report (Ex. C). 
Had he stated in his oral testimony that he had changed his mind and now felt that the auto 
collision had only resulted in a temporary flare-up, that would be a medical opinion, 
although perhaps a weak one. But to say that both views are equally valid is meaningless. 
In fact in his medical report he seems to indicate just the opposite. At page 14 of the report 
he says: 
Given the chronicity of symptoms noted in the medical records prior to the 
motor vehicle accident of 9-18-98, I believe it is likely that even if the 
accident of 9-18-98 had never occurred the patient would still have sufficient 
subjective symptoms involving her lumbosacral region to cause Ms. Marshall 
to avoid certain strenuous physical activities. It is possible or perhaps even 
probable that the accident of 9/18/98 caused the patient to have a permanent 
increase in subjective symptoms. It would be impossible based upon the 
current state of medical art to delineate to what degree the accident of 9-18-
98 increased the patient's probable preexisting symptoms well documented in 
the medical records between 1-30-98 and 9-10-98. Based upon the current 
available objective medical data, I believe it would be reasonable to assign 
the responsibility of the patient's current subjective symptoms of pain and 
discomfort which cause her to voluntarily restrict her physical activities 
equally between the accidents of 1-30-98, August 1998 and 9-18-98. As 
discussed previously in this report, I believe the accident that occurred in May 
1999 was the least significant of the patient's four documented injury dates. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Although Dr. Chung states in his testimony at pages 238 and 239 that 
plaintiffs condition would most likely have been the same without the accident, it should 
be noted that when he made a similar statement at page 251 and was pressed on the point he 
21 
immediately reverted to the alternative theories approach. Furthermore, the entire 
testimony at pages 238 and 239 came in response to or as a follow-up to the question as to 
whether any further treatment was necessary "related to the motor vehicle accident." His 
answer was that further treatment was not necessary, but that such was reasonable, meaning 
that further treatment resulting from the automobile collision was reasonable. We submit 
that treatment which is "reasonable" is also "necessary" within the meaning of that term as 
it applies to recoverable medical expenses. We therefore believe the testimony at pages 
238 and 239 support plaintiffs position that the injuries from the automobile collision were 
permanent rather that the opposite. 
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE OF PERMANENT INJURY: 
The collision was severe. Plaintiff was traveling 40 mph (Tr. 363: 76), and 
damage to her vehicle was about $2,000. (Tr. 363: 69) A summary of other evidence of 
permanent injury resulting from the automobile collision is as follows: 
RELEVANT PORTIONS OF MEDICAL REPORT OF DR. CHUNG DATED JUNE 23, 
2003 (EX C): 
Pages 12 - 14: 
CAUSATION: 
Ms. Marshall appears to personally believe that the entirety of her current 
problems related to myofascial pain syndrome affecting her spine is a result 
of the motor vehicle accident that occurred on 9-18-98. I would disagree 
with Ms. Marshall's opinions regarding causation. According to the medical 
records I have reviewed today, Ms. Marshall required medical treatment for 
myofascial pain syndrome affecting her spine between 1-30-98 THROUGH 
9-10-98. There is documentation of at least two separate episodes involving 
the spine on 1-30-98 and in August 1998. I believe it would be extremely 
unlikely between 9-10-98 and 9-18-98 that the patient would have a 
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completed 100% resolution of symptoms. 
Based upon the medical records I have reviewed, it appears that the flare up 
caused by the motor vehicle accident of 9-18-98 was objectively as severe 
and significant as the episodes documented in the medical records of 1-30-98 
and August 1998. In May 1999, the patient had another aggravation of her 
preexisting myofascial symptoms affecting her spine. The patient was seen 
only once in follow up after this aggravation on 5/25/99 by Dr. Petron. Prior 
instances of injury on 1/30-98 , August 1998 and 9-18-98 required more 
treatment visits. The episode of 5/25/99 was the only date of injury where the 
patient had just one treatment visit. 
Starting on 3-2-00, the patient again complained of low back pain which was 
worked up with benign plain films for the lumbar spine. No other dates of 
injury are noted in the medical records between 3-2-00 and 11-9-00. 
It is my opinion based un the medical records I reviewed today that the 
accidents of 1-30-98, August 1998 and 9-18-98 were all equally significant. 
It is my opinion that the accident documented in the report from Dr. Petron 
on 5-25-99 was least significant. I am basing this opinion on the post injury 
treatment records that indicate the patient required ongoing medical treatment 
for myofascial pain syndrome affecting the spine. 
PRIOR TREATMENT: 
The patient appears to have been treated in a reasonable and appropriate 
fashion by Dr. Petron and her prior physical therapist. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER TREATMENT: 
It is highly unlikely that medical treatment of any sort will be curative for this 
patient. Trigger point injections are likely to provide this patient with 
temporary improvement in symptoms without changing her overall long-term 
prognosis or ability to function. Ms. Marshall most likely achieved medical 
stability following the accident of 9-18-98 on 12-17-98. I believe she reached 
medical stability on 12-17-98, because the patient did not seek medical 
treatment with Dr. Petron for close to four months between 12-17-98 and 4-
14-99. 
WORK/ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS: 
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[The second paragraph of this section is relevant but is set forth in full at page 
21 above and is not repeated here.] 
FURTHER COMMENTS: 
The opinions put forth above are based upon subjective information gained 
frm the patient and objective information gained from review of the medical 
records and physical examination. Further information may indeed change 
the opinions put forth above. 
Charges put forth in this evaluation are based upon two hours spent in 
medical record review, twenty minutes spent in evaluation and discussion 
with patient and forty-five minutes spend in medical documentation 
preparation. 
DR. CHUNG'S SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF 7/15/03 (Ex..C): 
My sense is that she is dealing with an essentially lifelong condition at this 
point given her lack of response. 
PLAINTIFF'S OWN TESTIMONY: 
Tr. 363: 86 and 87 on cross-examination by Mr. Burt: 
Q Ms. Marshall, I just want to make sure I understand what your claims are. 
Is it your contention that all of your current problems and symptoms are 
related to injuries you sustained in the motor vehicle accident? 
A I can't say whether they are. I know Fm in recent pain, I was doing fine 
until the accident, and now Fm in constant pain where I don't sleep at night. 
Q You're not sure whether -1 just want to make sure I understand, you're not 
sure whether your current pain complaints all stemmed from the motor 
vehicle accident, or whether some of them are a result of the two prior work 
related incidents? 
A I was doing fine before the accident. Since the accident Fm in more pain, 
no sleep, muscle spasms, can't do the things I would like to do. 
Q And you're attributing all of that to the motor vehicle accident, though? 
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A I was felling fine before that. I was feeling pretty good. I was feeling 
better than now. I was sleeping a little bit. 
Q Alright, Mr. Marshall, forgive me, but I just want to understand. Are you 
attributing all of that - all of those symptoms and all of those problems which 
you're now having to the motor vehicle accident? 
A Yes. 
Q And it's our testimony that you were feeling fine before the motor vehicle 
accident? 
A Yes. 
Tr. 363: 80 on direct examination by Mr. Madsen: 
Q Where was your pain this time? 
A Right where -1 hurt injured from my up - lower lumbar shoulder back 
(inaudible) the shoulder blade there. 
Q On the left side? 
A Left side. 
Q And how long did that continue? 
A It's still continuing. 
Tr.363: 85 on direct examination by Mr. Madsen: 
Q Are there days when you're free of pain? 
A. No. 
Q Any day at all? 
A No. 
DR. PETRON'S TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL RECORDS: 
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DR. PETRON'S TESTIMONY: 
Tr. 363: 159-161 on direct examination by Mr. Madsen: 
Q Now if, in fact, she had not had that injury - that motor vehicle accident, 
what would your opinion have been as to her full recovery? 
A I don't know if she would have full recovery, but it sounded like she was 
doing well up until - up until she had the motor vehicle accident. 
Q Now following that accident, and your continuing treatment, for a period, 
as I would summarize your report, she appeared to be getting some 
improvement. But then it became chronic or persistent and stayed thereafter. 
Is that so? 
A Right. 
Q. For the rest of your treatment? And would those pains be consistent with 
the kind of a motor vehicle accident that she described to you that happened 
on the 19th of September, 1998? 
AI didn't really describe the motor vehicle accident in my notes, so I can't 
really say if the symptoms are consistent with the motor vehicle accident but 
a motor vehicle accident could cause some of these symptoms. 
Q but [sic!] for that accident, do you have an opinion as to whether she would 
have otherwise recovered? You indicated earlier nearly so and I'm just 
saying... 
A Well, based on - on the record as I look back on 8/24/98, she was a 
hundred percent better, and then she lifted a patient, she re-injured her back 
lifting the patient, at that time it was thoracic back pain. 
Q Then on the 10th? 
A. Then on the 10th, she's still having some thoracic back pain -
Q But is improving (inaudible) five trigger points. 
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A Correct. 
Q Isn't there some language in that visit that again suggests continuing 
improvement. 
A Right. So she had - she had been 100% better up until the re-exacerbation, 
and then continued improvement. 
Tr. 363: 172 on cross-examination by Mr. Burt: 
Q Okay. Thank you, Doctor. 
Doctor, let me just ask you a couple of additional questions. The question 
was asked, but for the accident of September of 1998, would she have gotten 
better. And I sensed that you were somewhat hesitant to answer that 
question. 
A It's always hard to speculate if someone would be better. It seemed like 
she was getting better, that in August she was a hundred percent better and 
then had a re-exacerbation, and then on 9/10 she was still having some pain 
but was improving. And so typically when somebody has myofascial pain 
when there's - when there's not underlying problems, they tend to get better. 
Q. Okay. And you can't say, then, whether those symptoms, the symptoms 
she was having before the accident would have gone away without the 
accident. 
AI can't say with a hundred percent certainty, no. 
Q You say that to a reasonable degree of medical probability that those 
symptoms would have gone away. 
A I would expect that they would've gone away, because typically 
myofascial pain would go away. 
Q So typically - what is myofascial pain? 
A Just muscle pain, spasm. 
Q Okay, and does is there anything (inaudible) - when you diagnose a patient 
with myofascial pain, is there any kind of criteria for the duration of that pain 
27 
that the patient must satisfy in order to meet that diagnosis? 
A No. 
RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM DR. PETRON'S MEDICAL RECORDS 
(Ex. 1 ): 
8/24/98 
Chief Complaint: Back pain. 
History of Present Illness. Brenda was 100% better until she went on a call 
last week and attempted to lift a patient and re-injured her back. She has had 
some upper lumbar, lower thoracic back pain since that time. She denies any 
numbness, tingling or change in bowel or bladder habits. She denies any 
referred pain. She is mainly just feeling stiffness, decreased ROM and pain in 
her lower thoracic spine. 
9/10/98 
Chief Complaint: Thoracic back pain. 
History of Present Illness: Brenda has had a reexacerbation of some of her 
thoracic back pain. I spoke to Lee in physical therapy today and he states that 
she seems to be coming [sic!] quite dependant on physical therapy. He would 
like to try to advance her to a home exercise program. 
9/22/98 
Chief Complaint: Thoracic back pain. 
History of Present Illness: Brenda was doing well until she was in a MVA 
and reinjured her back. She has had some increased pain again. 
MEDICAL REPORT OF 9/23/98 OF PHYSICAL THERAPIST, TERESA HALL, TO 
WHOM PLAINTIFF WAS REFERRED BY DR. PETRON (Page 17 of Ex. 1): 
HISTORY: This patient is a 49-year-old female who was involved in a motor 
vehicle accident on 9/19/98. She was driving when a car turned in front of 
her, causing her to broadside another car. She denies hitting her head but is 
complaining of pain across the chest and the front of her left groin from the 
lap belt. The pain is aggravated with sitting more than 2-3 minutes and 
prolonged standing or walking with a long stride. She feels better lying on her 
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right side. She needs to take Flexeril in order to be able to sleep comfortably 
through the night. The patient is a home health aide. She was on light duty for 
work from a previous back injury and was released to return to full time when 
she was involved in this motor vehicle accident. She has received physical 
therapy at Red Butte Clinic from 12/97 until 7/15/98. Since her accident, the 
patient has treated her symptoms by soaking in a hot tub. She currently rates 
her pain at a 9/10. Her goal is to be able to return to full duty work, as soon as 
possible. 
Excepts from Letter of Dr. Petron to Robert C. Cummings of 10/22/01 (Ex.2, last page): 
1) Brenda has primarily cervical and thoracic myofascial pain. Her symptoms 
started after the accident, but it is difficult to put a degree of causation. 
Typically these symptoms resolve spontaneously after a whiplash type injury 
and it would be unusual to continue for such a prolonged period of time. 
2) The treatment she has received under my care has included physical 
therapy, trigger point injections, progressive strengthening and medication for 
pain control. 
3) Her progress has been fairly steady, but not complete relief of the pain and 
she continues to be bothered with myofascial pain that I think will likely 
persist. 
4) She has not sustained any permanent disability as far as loss of range of 
motion or any objective impairment or disfigurement that we can see on an 
MRI or x-ray, but she continues to have the persistent myofascial pain. 
5)1 think she is likely to need occasional trigger point injections, medications 
and physical therapy from time to time to continue to treat this pain. I 
don't anticipate Brenda needing any type of bracing or surgery or any other 
invasive procedure. (Emphasis added.) 
DR. DALL'S TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL RECORDS: 
DR. DALL'S TESTIMONY: 
Tr. 364: 187-189 on direct examination by Mr. Madsen: 
Q. Thank you. Did you - you already indicated you have - you were 
available, had readily available records of Dr. Petron and his treatments. 
Then continue on as to what your sense was as to her (inaudible). The 
conclusion of my sense, therefore, is in you report. 
A You want me just to read that? 
Q Would you, please? 
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A My sense, therefore, is that she had a relatively straight forward myofascial 
problem that had gone gently awry given consideration and her tendency to 
avoid activity because of pain. 
Q Now you say, gone gently awry, do you mean that's the normal the process 
of deterioration, or how - what does that characterize in your mine [sic!]? 
A Not terribly unusual for this type of problem, it had gone into chronicity. A 
lot of people with this type of injury will have maintained symptoms for long 
periods of time. 
Q And is it consistent with an act that it was some four years before? 
A Yes. 
Q. Some - these kind of symptoms appear at a later date and become more 
pronounced over time? 
A I felt that the history she presented was very consistent with the type of 
injury that she described. 
Q What has been you experience with regard to long-term conditions 
following injuries of this nature? 
A My experience is that a person who has had a ceratin set of symptoms for 
two years basically won't have much substantive change subsequent to that 
time. 
Q So do you have an opinion as to what her prognosis is, what the future 
looks like for her? 
A I feel that the past is the best predictor of the future in most cases like this, 
and so I would expect that the foreseeable future will be very much like what 
her last three or four years have been. 
Q For a period of time, or for the rest of her life, or -
A For the foreseeable future. I don't see anything changing, so I guess we 
could say for the rest of her life. 
Tr. 364: 208 on cross-examination by Mr. Burt: 
Q Okay. And you would agree with this statement, would you not, that in 
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order for you to determine what the - let me rephrase it this way. If she is 
going to need care in the future, one of the things that - if we're trying to 
determine the cause of the need for that care in the future, which is one of the 
questions in this case, you would agree that you have to look at all of her 
injuries, would you not? 
A Yes. 
Q And all of those injuries would contribute to - all of those injuries would 
contribute to this ongoing pain. 
A Yes. 
Q It's not just one isolated incident that would cause this patient in particular 
to need care in the future, is it? 
A If again we're speaking in general terms, that's correct. If we're speaking 
in very specific terms, i.e. Ms. Marshall, I really don't have the records that I 
need to make that kind of a statement. 
RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM MEDICAL RECORDS OF DR. DALL (Ex. 2 ): 
3/25/03 
Brenda Marshall presents today for evaluation of chronic low back pain. Shefs seen 
Dr. Petron over the years though it's been three or four years since she last saw him. 
She states that she first injured her back at work in about May 1998. She saw Dr. 
Petron who did a series of trigger point injections. She seemed to be getting 
better and then was involved in an auto accident in September 1998 which 
exacerbated things. He continued to see her through 1999 at which point she was 
discharged. Since then her insurance has changed so that she has not been able to 
return to see him. Basically she's just been putting up with her symptoms. Initially 
she states that due to an increased work load she's doing worse but when asked to 
compare herself now to how she was when she was discharged by Dr. Petron, 
she feels she's actually improved. 
PHYSICAL EXAM: 
The myofascial exam reveals diffuse tenderness to palpation extending 
essentially from the mid-axillary line to the spinous processes and from the 
inferior border of the scapula down to the mid-buttock almost in a perfect 
rectangle. Her response to palpation within this area is dramatic (she's constantly 
batting my hand away) and as soon as I move out of this area she has no other 
tenderness. She is not tender to light touch and pressure applied with my palm is 
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much better tolerated than with a fingertip. 
IMPRESSION: 
My sense therefore is that she has a relatively straightforward myofascial 
problem that has gone gently awry given to it's duration and her tendency to 
avoid activity because of pain. 
TREATMENT PLAN: 
All of the above is discussed with the patient at length and in detail. Our plan 
will be get her going in physical therapy and I am referring her to Rick Lybbert 
for this. She understands that just like her hypertension is managed with 
antihypertensives, her myofascial pain is managed through exercise. It's not 
what we do but what she does that will make the difference. It will not come 
overnight but over weeks and months. I do not expect full resolution of 
symptoms but would like to see some improvement. The good thing is that the 
patient remains functional (working full-time) and is not using medications. I 
will follow up with her in four weeks. 
4/22/03 
TREATMENT PLAN: 
I recommend continued treatment for another four to six visits. By then we 
should have achieved of goals of training the patient to be her own therapist. 
I've indicated that given the duration of symptoms, and the type of work she 
does, I don't expect her to be pain-free. Our goals are towards self-
management and maintained function. She understands the above. I'll see her 
back in six weeks. 
06/03/2003 
IMPRESSION: 
Widespread chronic- myofascial pain. While she was involved in a motor 
vehicle accident five years ago, her complaints predate that. My sense is that 
she is dealing with an essentially lifelong condition at this point given her lack 
of response. 
TREATMENT PLAN: 
I think the best thing she can do for herself is to continue working on 
activation and conditioning. If she can't tolerate lightweight exercises on 
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land, perhaps she would do better in water. IVe recommended she look 
into pool aerobics and have given her a handout with a number of pools 
and resources. We'll see how she does with that. 
I don't think I have anything to offer at this point and have not scheduled 
followup. 
Plaintiff believes that a careful consideration of the evidence in this action 
demonstrates that the clear weight of the evidence is that plaintiffs injuries from the 
automobile collision were permanent. Both Dr. Petron and Dr. Dall concur that plaitniff s 
condition is permanent. Dr. Chung's written report confirms this. Dr. Chung's oral 
testimony to the extent it deviates therefrom does not constitute a credible opinion at all. 
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO 
PROVE PERMANENT INJURIES BASED ON OBJECTIVE FINDINGS. 
The lower court entered a judgment of no cause of action on the basis that plaintiff 
had failed to meet the threshhold requirements of Section 31 A-22-309(l)(a) UCA. At the 
oral argument on the motion for a new trial, it was noted that neither party had requested a 
instruction specifically on the issue of whether plaintiff had sustained permanent injuries 
based upon objective findings. It was further noted that Rule 49(a) URCP states that if in 
giving its instructions to the jury: 
"...If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings 
or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the 
issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission 
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may 
make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a 
finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict." 
The lower court thereupon made the following findings (R. 348-350): 
" 1 . The Court is convinced, based in part on the fact that the jury did not 
award future special damages, that the jury accepted Dr. Jeffrey Chung's 
opinion that the auto accident caused a temporary exacerbation of a pre-
existing condition which exacerbation resolved within a few months and 
that on or about December 17, 1998 she had returned to her pre-auto 
accident baseline condition. The Court Finds that the jury accepted the 
first of Dr. Chung's options - that is she had a temporary exacerbation of 
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a pre-existing condition and that the medical care related to that 
exacerbation lasted from the date of the auto accident until approximately 
December 17, 1998. This finding is consistent with the jury's verdict and 
the greater weight of the evidence presented at trial. 
"2. The auto accident did not cause a permanent impairment. 
"3. There was no permanent impairment based upon objective findings. There is 
no objective test for myofascial pain. The diagnosis of myofascial pain is based 
entirely on the patient's self report of pain. 
"4. The Court is convinced that Plaintiffs condition is permanent but is 
also convinced that it is not permanent because of the auto accident. The 
condition was permanent before the auto accident." 
Thus the court not only accepted Dr. Chung's erroneous alternative theory of 
temporary injury, which we have shown in Point 1 above to be against the weight of the 
evidence, but further found that in any event there were no objective findings upon which a 
diagnosis of permanent injury could ever be made with regard to myofascial pain, because 
a diagnosis of "myofascial pain is based entirely on the patient's self report of pain." 
Plaintiff contends that these findings are improper and in any event erroneous. 
As to the impropriety thereof, the issue of liability was submitted to the jury 
without any specificity as to permanent injury based upon objective findings. The parties 
submitted the issue of liability to the jury in the form of Instructions No. 27 and 28, and by 
special verdict form (all included in Addendum hereto) the jury was asked to determine if 
defendant was negligent, and if that negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff s 
injuries. The jury so found. (Fault apportioned to defendant was 90%.) Submitting the 
issue of liability to the jury in that manner constituted a waiver of any requirement with 
regard to a finding of permanent injury based upon objective findings. Also, failure to 
move for a directed verdict normally precludes defendant from later claiming the evidence 
was insufficient to sustain the verdict and the absence of such in this case should bar 
defendant from claiming lack of permanent injury based upon objective findings. 
34 
Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975) Judge Quinn's findings improperly 
infringe upon issues properly submitted to the jury. 
In addition to the fact that the court's findings should not have been made in 
the first place, the substance of the findings is also erroneous and against the clear weight 
of the evidence. The lower court erred in finding that there is no objective test for 
myofascial pain. It should be noted that the court did not find that there are objective tests 
for myofascial pain, but plaintiff didn't prove such. The court has found that by definition, 
neither plaintiff nor anyone else can prove such permanent injury by objective findings, 
and accordingly the court did not have to canvass the testimony and medical reports to see 
if proof existed. We believe the court was in error in this regard. 
We respectfully submit that "objective findings" means nothing more than 
that the disability or impairment be based upon what a physician determines from his own 
physical examination. On the other hand subjective findings are those based upon what the 
patient tells the physician apart from what the physician determines from his or her own 
physical examination. This distinction appears to be of long standing. In the cases the 
exact wording changes from time to time and from case to case. Sometimes the cases are 
concerned with objective "symptoms" and sometimes with objective "findings," but the 
aforesaid distinction appears to remain consistent in the cases. For example in the early 
case of Dean v. Wabash R. Co..229 Mo. 425, 129 SW 953 (1910) the distinction is 
explained in this manner: 
"Objective symptoms are those which the surgeon discovers from a 
physical examination of his patient; subjective symptoms are those he 
learns from what his patient tells him. When a surgeon is called to serve 
a patient who has received an injury, the full extent of which he is unable 
to learn by his own sense of seeing, feeling or hearing, he puts questions 
to the patient and learns from him what he can of the hidden injury; he 
asks him what pains he feels or what other sensations he experiences, and 
from those sources he forms his opinion on which he prescribes for his 
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patient. A surgeon is not always bound to take as truth what his patent 
tells him, because sometimes the facts which his own physical 
examination has shown may in his mind prove that the patient's statement 
is incorrect, sometimes he may shrewdly detect a willful suppression or 
misrepresentation, sometimes a delusion. But when he has no cause to 
suspect untruth or delusion he takes what his patient says, and weighs the 
subjective symptoms with those he discovered, and on them he bases his 
diagnosis and proceeds to his prescription." 
Case law makes it clear that objective findings are not limited to what can be 
seen or ascertained by touch. As state in Van Vleet v. York Public Serv. Co., I l l Nebr. 
51,53, 195 NW 467 
(1923): 
"Defendant's idea is that by objective symptoms are meant symptoms of 
an injury which can be seen or ascertained by touch. We are of the 
opinion that the expression has a wider meaning, and that symptoms of 
pain, and anguish, such as weakness, pallor, sickness, nausea, expressions 
of pain clearly involuntary, or any other symptoms indicating a 
deleterious change in the bodily condition may constitute objective 
symptoms as required by the statute." 
Franz v. Schroeder. 184 La 945, 168 So. 110 (1936) was a worker's 
compensation case. In that case the court held at page 110: 
"In 46 Corpus Juris, p. 846, 'objective symptoms' is defined as follows: 
'In medicine, those which a physician, by ordinary use of his senses, 
discovers from a physical examination.1 And in a footnote thereunder, 
under the caption, 'Not limited to symptoms ascertainable by touch,' 
citing Van Vleet v. Public Service Co. of York, 111 Neb. 51, 53, 195 
N.W.467, 468..." 
If anything, it appears that the meaning of "objective findings" has been 
expanded and become more Jiberal over time. In a recent worker's compensation case in 
Oregon, SAIF v. Lewis, 58 P3d 814 (2002), the Supreme Court of Oregon in overruling a 
more restrictive opinion of the Court of Appeals of Oregon noted at page 818 of the 
Supreme Court opinion that the Oregon statute provided that: 
"Such objective findings include either physical findings or subjective 
responses to physical examinations that are 'reproducible, measurable or 
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observable." 
The court went on to hold at page 819: 
"An essential characteristic of the definition in ORS 656.005(19) is 
that it does not constrain the person who identifies an indication of injury 
or disease to rely solely on his or her own perceptions or examinations. 
Medical personnel act in accordance with ORS 656.005(19) by 
employing the range of diagnostic methods that their professions 
prescribe, including such techniques as consulting with nurses, 
technicians, therapists, and other health care professionals; examining the 
patient's medical records; reviewing the reports of witnesses, 
investigators, and police officers; and interviewing the patient, family 
members, friends, coworkers, and others who might have information that 
pertains to an indication of injury or disease. Information gleaned from 
such sources may be sufficient to establish that a claimant had or has an 
indication of injury or disease. If so, then the board properly may 
characterize that indication as 'verifiable.' 
"We have discovered no other contextual sources that shed any 
further or different light on the meaning of'objective findings' in ORS 
656.005(19). In our view, the meaning of that statutory definition is clear 
and arises from the ordinary meaning of the terms that the legislature used 
in enacting that statute." 
No Utah case has been found defining "objective findings." In McNair v. 
Farris, 944 P2d 392 (UtApp 1997) the Utah Court of Appeals dealt with the matter from 
the standpoint of what did not constitute objective findings, but did not really spell out 
affirmatively what the term meant. In McNair, our Court of Appeals held that statements 
in plaintiffs deposition are not sufficient to meet the requirements of objective findings. 
The court stated at page 395: 
"The express language of section 31 A-22-309(l)(a) requires that any 
permanent disability or impairment be based on objective findings. 
McNair thus has the burden of demonstrating the permanency of his 
injury with something more than his say so." 
The court makes clear in McNair that testimony of a physician is required, but gives no 
indication that Utah would in any way depart from what appears to be the general rule as 
stated above that objective findings are those arrived at by the physician from his 
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examination of the patient and not based solely on the subjective statements of that patient. 
This conclusion seems to be borne out by the definition of the term "objective 
medical impairment" as used in the Public Employees Long Term Disability Act found at 
49-21-401 et seq. UCA. Subsection (6) thereof states: 
"'Objective medical impairment1 means an impairment resulting from an 
injury or illness which is diagnosed by a physician and which is based on 
accepted objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective 
complaints." 
It is therefore clear that such things as pallor, sickness, nausea, expressions of 
pain clearly involuntary, muscle spasms and other like conditions discernable to the 
physician independent of the statements of the patient constitute objective findings. 
In this action the findings of the experts were all based upon physical 
examination and other tests performed by them. Their opinions were not based solely upon 
what plaintiff told them. 
The records contain ample references to the actual examinations and tests 
performed by the physicians. For example, Dr. Dall's record of March 25, 2003 (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 2) states in relevant part: 
"The myofascial exam reveals diffuse tenderness to palpation extending 
essentially from the mid-axillary line to the spinous processes and from 
the inferior border of the scapula down to the mid-buttock almost in a 
perfect rectangle. Her response to palpation within this area is dramatic 
(she's constantly batting my hand away) and as soon as I move our of this 
area she has no other tenderness. She is not tender to light touch and 
pressure applied with my palm is much better tolerated than with a 
fingertip." (Emphasis added.) 
That clearly meets the test referred to above of "symptoms of pain, and anguish, such as 
weakness, pallor, sickness, nausea, expressions of pain clearly involuntary..." (Emphasis 
added.) 
There are numerous references to the medical records in evidence in this 
38 
action which constitute "objective findings." A few such were furnished the lower court 
as Appendix 1 to Plaintiffs Memorandum Opposing No Cause Judgment ( R. 299 and 
300) and those pages are included in Addendum hereto. 
The lower court was perhaps led into the foregoing error by the testimony of 
Dr. Chung as elicited by defendant's counsel. Dr. Chung testified as to the meaning of 
"objective" and "subjective" at some length. Dr. Chung testified that any finding that is in 
any way dependent upon the statements or actions of a patient is subjective. He admitted 
that physicians often base their diagnosis on what a patient says, but still insisted that 
anything which can be influenced by a patient is subjective. 
For example, Dr. Chung stated at Tr. 364: 245: 
"A You know, physicians typically, you know, have a reason for 
distinguishing between words, and the words subjective and objective are 
very important. Subjective means that it's a complaint that can be 
influenced by a patient consciously. OK, an objective finding is 
something that cannot be influenced by a patient. Ms. Marshall's 
complaints are entirely subjective. That doesn't mean they - they don't 
exist, but it can't be conformed or proved by a test, like x-ray or MRI 
scan. 
Q I just want to be clear here. There, according to your review of these 
medical records, there was nothing objective go [sic!] demonstrate that 
she in fact was injured. You don't dispute that she was. 
A Right. Right, you know, there are a lot of diseases like myofascial pain 
syndrome that cannot be objectified. You can't do a test that shows it 
exists or not. I see no reason not to believe Ms. Marshall when she says 
she hurts, or that these areas are tender, or you know, that she saw the 
doctors that she say and said what she said. 
But you have to also understand that objective things help because it 
takes away any uncertainly. A broken bone is a broken bone is a broken 
bone, and it show up on an x-ray. Now there are some things that you can 
see on x-ray that are subjective findings. For example, loss of cervical 
lordosis means that the neck is straight. Okay, right now I've lost the 
cervical lordosis, and we say that on x-ray, but radiologists say loss of 
cervical lordosis. Well, obviously the position of your neck is something 
that you can control. That's a subjective finding. A broken bone, a torn 
ligament, or gap in your bones that cannot be consciously influenced is an 
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objective finding." 
That may be Dr. Chung's understanding of subjective and objective, but it is 
for the court to declare the law and not Dr. Chung, and although the court seems to have 
accepted Dr. Chung's view, plaintiff believes that it is erroneous view, and that in adopting 
it the lower court judge has committed prejudicial error in law. The correct view we 
believe is expressed in the authorities set out above and that procedures which physicians 
regularly use in reaching a diagnosis (including statements by the patient) should be held to 
be objective withing the meaning of Section 30A-22-309(l)(a)(iii). In the last analysis, 
even Dr. Chung seems to be in accord with this view in formulating his own opinions 
because he states at page 14 of his report of 6/23/03 (Ex. C): 
"The opinions put forth above are based upon subjective information 
gained from the patient and objective information gained from review of 
the medical records and physical examination../' 
This is the way physicians conduct their business, and we do not think the legislature 
intended (nor is it proper for the lower court) to impose a new or different standard. 
Without conceding the larger point, we note out of prudence, that since 
plaintiff established the permanent nature of her injuries by objective findings, in all events 
the small verdict she received should not have been taken from her as the court did, 
although it should have been set aside and a new trial granted which we discuss in the next 
point. 
POINT 3 . THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE 
GENERAL DAMAGES. 
Rule 59(a) URCP provides in relevant part: 
"(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any 
of the following causes...: 
"(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
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under the influence of passion or prejudice." 
"(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against law." 
Plaitniff submits that the only credible evidence in this action is that 
plaintiffs injuries were severe and permanent, and the jury's award of the miserly sum of 
$2200 for general damages was clearly inadequate and appears to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice, or under a misunderstanding of the facts and law in 
this case, or against the clear weight of the evidence. Nevertheless the lower court denied 
plaintiffs motion for a new trial. This was error. 
To the extent denial of said motion for a new trial is based upon the lower 
courf s erroneous concept of the meaning of permanent injuries based upon "objective 
findings," the lower court's action should be reviewed for correctness. Clearly Judge 
Quinn's erroneous view of the law was determinative of or at least greatly influenced his 
decision not to grant a new trial, and because of that error in law, a new trial should have 
been granted pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) URCP. 
It also clearly appears that Judge Quinn was influenced in his decision not to grant 
a new trial because he thought the jury had accepted Dr. Chung's alternative "temporary" 
injury theory, which he himself felt was supported by the "greater weight of the evidence" 
(Finding No. 1). If as plaintiff contends Dr. Chung's alternative theory of temporary 
injury is erroneous (plaintiffs Point 1 in this brief), then it seems clear that Judge Quinn 
was in error in not granting a new trial on the ground that the jury verdict was clearly based 
upon insufficient evidence, upon a proposition clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
If the lower court's denial of motion for new trial is not viewed as an error of law, 
then such action in denying said motion for a new trial is reviewed on appeal as held in 
Crookston, supra, to determine if there is a reasonable basis for the decision. The court in 
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that case held at page 805: 
In reviewing the judge's ultimate decision to grant or deny a new trial, we 
will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. 
In order however to determine that question, it is necessary to bear in mind the available 
parameters of the lower court's discretion, and we therefore review some of the Utah cases 
on the granting of motions for new trial. 
There is ample support in Utah case law for the granting of a new trial based upon 
inadequate damages. 
In Saltas v. Affleck, supra, the plaintiffs son was killed in an automobile 
collision. The decedent had a life expectancy of 35 years and 3 months. The jury awarded 
plaintiff $800. The trial court required defendant to agree to a judgment of $2,400, 
otherwise a new trial would be granted. Defendant refused the additur. The new trial 
resulted in a judgment for plaintiff of $3,061. The granting of the new trial was upheld on 
appeal. The Utah statute on new trials because of passion and prejudice at the time of the 
Saltas case was in essence the same as it is now, although worded somewhat differently 
(See Sec. 104-40-7 R. S. Utah 1933). Our Supreme Court held at page 178: 
"However, if inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict presents a 
situation that such inadequacy or excessiveness shows a disregard by the 
jury of the evidence or the instructions of the court as to the law 
applicable to the case as to satisfy the court that the verdict was rendered 
under such disregard or misapprehension of the evidence or instructions 
or under the influence of passion or prejudice then the court may exercise 
its discretion in the interest of justice and grant a new trial." 
The court went on to state also on page 178: 
"We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting a motion for a 
new trial. It may be there was sufficient in the record of the former trial to 
justify the trial court in concluding the jury had disregarded or 
misconceived the instructions given or the evidence. Damages in the sum 
of $800 may have seemed sufficiently inadequate as to cause the court to 
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think the verdict was the result of bias or prejudice. Whether such bias or 
prejudice existed we have no means of determining except from the 
amount of the verdict." 
In this case the jury requested further instruction on the meaning of the 
various categories of damages (Tr. 364: 306-7). It appears clear that they did not 
understand the instructions on damages. In any event they certainly did not follow them, 
and did not award reasonable damages. The jury did not award an amount that any 
reasonable person could claim was sufficient for a lifetime of pain and suffering, nor even 
30% of such an amount. 
Chatelain v. Thackeray, supra, was a case decided by our Supreme Court a 
little earlier the same year as Saltas. In Chatelain, the jury had awarded special damages to 
plaintiff of $274.87, general damages to plaintiff of $100 and damages for the death of 
plaintiff wife of $1,000. The trial court held the award inadequate and granted a new trial. 
The Supreme Court affirmed and noted that the deceased wife's life expectancy was 42.87 
years, she was in good health and assisted plaintiff in his work for which she was paid. 
The court held at page 198: 
"However, when the amount assessed by a jury bears no proper relation to 
the wrong suffered as shown by the evidence and in accordance with the 
instructions of the court, then a proper case is presented for the exercise 
by the court of its power to set aside verdicts. In this case the age of the 
decedent, the condition of her health, her expectancy of life, and the 
services rendered by her, render the award of $1,000 made by the jury to 
the plaintiff for her loss palpably inadequate, and indicates that the jury 
either disregarded or misconceived the evidence , or the courtfs 
instructions." 
The same is true in this case. The leading case in recent years on the subject of the 
granting of new trials appears to be Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, supra, where our 
Supreme Court held at page 804: 
"The reason that any determination as to whether the jury exceeded its 
proper bounds is best made in the first instance by the trial court is that 
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the trial judge is present during all aspects of the trial and listens to and 
views all witnesses. Therefore, he or she can best determine if the jury 
has acted with 'passion or prejudice1 and whether the award was too small 
or too large in light of the evidence. The trial judge is free to grant or 
deny a motion for a new trial if it is reasonable to conclude that the jury 
erred.... 
"Thus, in passing on a motion for a new trial, if the trial court cannot 
reasonable find that the jury erred, it should deny the motion. On the 
other hand, if the trial court can reasonably conclude that there was 
insufficient evidence to justify the verdict or it is manifestly against the 
weight of the evidence in violation of rule 59(a)(6) or that the jury acted 
with passion or prejudice contrary to rule 59(a)(5), it may grant the 
motion and order a new trial." 
Other like cases are as follows: Stack v. Kearns. 118 Utah 237, 221 P2d 594 (1950); 
Braithwaite v. West Valley City, 921 P.2d 997 (Utah 1996); Bodon v. Suhrman, 8 Utah 2d 
42, 327 P2d 826 (1958); and Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P2d 701 (Utah 
1961). [Wellman was overruled by Randle v. Allen. 862 P2d 1329 (Utah 1993) to the 
extent it approved the giving of an instruction on unavoidable accident.] 
In this case the clear weight of the evidence is that plaintiff has severe and 
permanent injuries resulting in constant pain. No reasonable person would conclude that 
such a condition merits only $2,200 in general damages. There does not appear to be any 
reasonable basis for the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial, where that court is 
operating an erroneous concept of the as to objective findings, under an equally erroneous 
concept of the validity of Dr. Chung's alternative theory, and given the clear inadequacy of 
$2,200 damages for severe and permanent injuries. 
POINT 4. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE 
SPECIAL DAMAGES. 
The uncontradicted evidence in this action was that plaintiff sustained special 
damages for medical care after the automobile collision of $6,305.37. There was no 
evidence to the contrary. The bills and summaries thereof ( Exhibits 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10) 
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were admitted in evidence on stipulation, and the parties are bound by the recitals therein. 
The jury only awarded special damages of $2,100 and in so doing it is clear that they acted 
with passion or prejudice, or that they "misapplied or failed to take into account proved 
facts, or misunderstood or disregarded the law or made findings clearly against the weight 
of the evidence." 
Also, the jury failed to award any damages for future specials, 
notwithstanding Dr. Dall testified that plaintiffs future specials from the automobile 
collision would probably be substantially the same as she had incurred theretofore. There 
was no evidence to the contrary. The awarding of no amount for future specials is a further 
indication that the jury acted with passion or prejudice, or that they "misapplied or failed to 
take into account proved facts, or misunderstood or disregarded the law or made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence." The conclusion is borne out by the fact that 
the jury after deliberating for a considerable time, requested further instructions on the 
definitions of the various kinds of damages. 
The medical bills having been admitted into evidence by stipulation of the 
parties without limitation were therefore admitted for all purposes. In 75 Am Jur 2d Trials, 
Section 417 it states in relevant part: 
"Where a party does not request an instruction limiting the evidence to a 
specific purpose, even though such evidence is otherwise inadmissible, 
that party waives any complaint to the general admission of the 
evidence." 
The uncontradicted and only evidence before the jury was that the medical 
expenses of plaintiff subsequent to the automobile collision amounted to $6,305.37. 
There was no basis in the evidence for the jury to apportion any part of the 
medical bills incurred after the automobile accident to any other incident, nor was there 
any instruction authorizing such apportionment. There is absolutely nothing in the 
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evidence to justify the jury in saying a particular bill incurred after the automobile collision 
is attributable to lifting incident No. 1 and should thus be excluded, or that such a bill is 
attributable to lifting incident No. 2 and should thus be excluded. In Tingey v. 
Christensen, 987 P 2d 588 (Utah 1999) our Supreme Court adopted as the rule of law in 
Utah that where no reasonable basis exists for apportioning special damages between a 
preexisting condition and a subsequent tort, the tortfeasor is responsible for all damages. 
The court held at page 592: 
"We hold that if the jury can find a reasonable basis for apportioning 
damages between a preexisting condition and a subsequent tort, it should 
do so; however, if the jury finds it impossible to apportion damages, it 
should find that the tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of damages." 
Tingey involved failure of the lower court to give a requested instruction covering that 
point of law. Although in this case no such instruction was requested, plaintiff believes 
that the court can and should find as a matter of law that no reasonable basis for 
apportionment exists in the present case and that therefore the principle applies. 
It is true that Dr. Chung testified that plaintiffs condition was only 30% 
caused by the automobile collision. Even if the jury accepted that view, it does not follow 
that the medical expenses incurred after the automobile accident are only 30% chargeable 
to the automobile collision. Dr. Chung himself said that all of the expenses from the date 
of the accident to basically to the end of the year of 1998 were the result of the automobile 
collision. This involves $680 of Dr. Petron's bills and University of Utah Physical 
Therapy bills of $591 and $661 for a total of $1,932.00. The remaining bills from 
plaintiffs Exhibit 10 amount to $4,196.30 (balance of Dr. Petron of $405, Dr. Dall's bill of 
$332 and Mountainlands Physical Therapy bill of $3,459.30). Adding the said $1,932 plus 
even 30% of $4,196.30 ($1,258.89) equals $3,190.89. (Plaintiff s Exhibits 4 ,5 ,7 ,9 and 
10) 
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Finally, the total bills incurred after the collision of September 19, 1998, 
were admittedly $6,305.37. Even if plaintiff s permanent injuries were caused in a 
30/30/30/10 percent manner (30% caused by the automobile collision) which is the best 
light that can be placed upon Dr. Chung's testimony, it does not follow that special 
damages incurred for medical care are only 30% attributable to the auto collision. If, for 
example, plaintiffs condition requires a one hour consultation, examination and treatment 
with her physician, there is no evidence that the auto collision is only responsible for 30% 
of 60 minutes, or in other words for 18 minutes. The entire hour of consultation, 
examination and treatment is necessitated by her total condition, which is one condition 
and not four conditions. The entire expenditure was necessary for the treatment of each 
and every part of the plaintiffs total condition. The same is true of medication. Can we 
say that 30% of a pill is all plaintiff is entitled to because of the automobile collision? If 
she needs a pill she needs the whole pill not just 30% of it. This is not a case where 30% 
of the dollars went to the automobile accident injuries as a distinguishable condition. 
Every dollar went to the treatment of one condition, and that total condition would not have 
existed but for the automobile collision, and said collision is a substantial and inseparable 
part of that one condition, and the total amount of the specials should be counted toward 
meeting the threshold, and are recoverable in this action. 
POINT 5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 15 AND 11. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16 RELATING TO 
PLAINTIFF'S PROBABLE LIFE EXPECTANCY. 
The trial court erred in failing to give plaintiffs requested instruction No. 16 
( R. 134) informing the jury that plaintiffs probable life expectancy (based upon mortality 
table) was 25.3 years. (Plaintiffs Requested Instructions Nos. 16, 15 and 11 included in 
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the Addendum hereto.) 
Rule 59(a)(7) provides for "Error in law" as the other relevant ground for a 
new trial under the facts of this case. It was error in law to fail to give the Plaintiffs 
Requested Instruction No. 16. Had this instruction been given the jury would have had a 
before it the probable duration (25.3 years) of plaintiff s suffering from the established 
severe and permanent injuries. This instruction would likely have resulted in a 
substantially larger verdict, and one which could be said to "fairly and adequately 
compensate the plaintiff." Failure to give this instruction was prejudicial error. Rule 
201(d) Utah Rules of Evidence provides with respect to judicial notice: 
"When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information." 
Utah Trial Handbook, 1994, David W. Schofield states in relevant part at p. 168: 
"Courts generally take judicial notice of the existence of standard 
mortality, or life expectancy, tables which seek to approximate the life 
span of men and women from past experience. 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 
Section 113." 
The applicable mortality table was furnished to the court from a reliable and 
accepted source, to-wit: Am Jur 2nd Desk Book. Certainly the requirements for judicial 
notice were met, and the this requested instruction should have been given, and failure to 
give it was prejudicial error.. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 15 RELATING TO 
AGGRAVATION OF PREEXISTING INJURY. 
The lower court erred in failing to give plaintiffs requested instruction No. 
15 ( R. 133). Said instruction was MUJI Instruction No. 27.7 rather than or together with 
MUJI Instruction No. 27.6 which was given. 
Plaintiff requested that the instruction found at MUJI No.27.7 be given instead of 
or at least along with the instruction found at MUJI No. 27.6 which was given. (Copy of 
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MUJI 27.7 and MUJI 27.6 are included in the Addendum hereto.) 
It was plaintiffs theory of the case that she had substantially recovered from any 
prior injuries. Plaintiff testified for example at Tr. 363: 86: 
Q And it's your testimony that you were feeling fine before the motor 
vehicle accident? 
A Yes. 
Plaintiff testified at Tr. 363: 74 that she had been released by Dr. Petron to go back to work 
two days before the accident and she testified that she was feeling fine at that time. At Tr. 
363: 162 in response to Mr. Madsen's question: "I just - a final question being, did you 
intend her to go back to full work activity as of that report [9/10/98]; is that correct? The 
last sentence? Advance hr to full duty shortly?" Dr. Petron answered: "Correct." That 
fact is also recorded in the records of Teresa Hall, physical therapist to whom plaintiff was 
referred by Dr. Petron who stated in her report of 9/23/98: "She was on light duty for work 
from a previous back injury and was released to return to full time when she was involved 
in this motor vehicle accident." Dr. Petron in his report of 9/22/98 said that "Brenda was 
doing well until she was in a MVA and reinjured her back. She has had some increased 
pain again." Furthermore, Dr. Petron testified that but for the accident she would have 
fully recovered. Both Dr. Dall and Dr. Petron testified that plaintiffs condition was 
consistent with and flowed from the injuries sustained in the automobile collision. It was 
thus plaintiffs theory that the automobile collision lighted-up her prior condition from 
which she had substantially recovered, and there was ample evidence to support plaintiffs 
theory, and plaintiff was entitled to have the jury instructed on her theory. This instruction 
is based on Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P2d 80 (Ut App 1987) which held at page 88: 
'The rule is well settled that when a defendant's negligence aggravates or 
lights up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition, or one to which 
the injured person is predisposed, the defendant is liable to the injured 
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person for the full amount of damages which ensue, notwithstanding such 
diseased or weakened condition. In other words, when a latent condition 
itself does not cause pain, but that condition plus an injury brings on pain 
by aggravating the pre-existing condition, then the injury, not the dormant 
condition, is the proximate cause of the pain and disability. A plaintiff, 
therefore, is entitled to recover all damages which actually and 
necessarily follow the injury." 
Failure to give Plaintiffs Requested Instruction No. 15 was prejudicial error 
C. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 RELATING 
TO LEFT TURNS IN THE FACE OF ONCOMING TRAFFIC. 
Plaintiff Requested Instruction No. 11 ( R. 129) instructs the jury that a car 
stopping in one lane to allow a left turn by defendant does not give right to defendant to 
expect other lanes to stop nor remove defendant's duty to yield to traffic in such other 
lanes. Although the court gave the first paragraph of this requested instruction, it refused 
to give the second paragraph. Said refused paragraph is in accord with the law (see Section 
41-6-73 UCA cited on page 4 of this brief), and should have been given. The evidence of 
any negligence on the part of plaintiff is really non-existent. This instruction would have 
been of substantial help to plaintiff, and failure to give it was prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, or to an additur 
awarding her $6,305.37 in special damages, a reasonable amount for future damages and a 
reasonable amount of general damages and costs. In all events plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment upon the verdict of the jury, together with costs. 
Dated this *2 £~day of October, 2004. 
GORDON A. MADSEN ~7^ 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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Mailed two copies of the within brief including addendum to Bruce C. Burt, 
attorney for defendant and appellee, at his address, 215 So. State, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this 7 > day of October, 2004. 
ADDENDUM 
Document No. 
VERDICT 1 
JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION 2 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 3. 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 15 AND 1 1 . . . .4 
MUJI 27.6 AND 27.7 5 
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 27 AND 28 6 
APPENDIX 1 FROM PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING 
NO CAUSE OF ACTION JUDGMENT WITH SOME ILLUSTRATIONS 
OF OBJECTIVE FINDINGS IN THE MEDICAL RECORDS 7 
DOCUMENT 1 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENDA J. MARSHALL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
O. STEWART PIERCE, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Civil No. 020908282 
Judge: Anthony B. Quinn 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of 
the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of 
the issue presented, answer **Yes.'' If you find the evidence is so 
equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the 
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against 
the issue presented, answer **No." Also, any damages assessed must 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Was the defendant, 0. Stewart Pierce, negligent as 
alleged by plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes yC No 
Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
3. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent, as alleged by 
the defendant? 
ANSWER: Yes A No 
4. Was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of the 
9a^ 
plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes yC No 
5. If you have answered both Questions 1 and 4 xxYes,'' 
then, and only then, answer the following question: Assuming all 
the negligence that proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries to 
total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
A. Plaintiff, 1 o % 
B. Defendant, ^ ° % 
TOTAL 100% 
If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 **Yes,7/ state the 
amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the 
plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of. If 
such questions were not answered x*Yes,'' do not answer this 
question. 
Special Damages: 
A. Past Special Damages $_2MJ_Oo_1_<^ o 
B. Future Special Damages $ 0 
General Damages: 
$ ~Ls7JQc> »oO 
TOTAL $ 4i^O- °Q 
day of January, 2004, 
Foreperson 
yx\ 
DOCUMENT 2 
MLEB DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 0 9 2004 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. 
BRUCE C. BURT, USB NO. 8453 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
215 South State Street, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENDA J. MARSHALL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
O. STEWART PIERCE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION 
Civil No. 020908282 
Judge Anthony Quinn 
On January 7 and 8, 2004 the above entitled matter was tried to a jury. The jury received 
evidence and, on January 8, 2004, returned a verdict. The jury returned the following verdict: 
1. Was the Defendant, O. Stewart Pierce, negligent as alleged by Plaintiff? Yes. 
2. Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff? Yes. 
3. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent, as alleged by the defendant? Yes. 
4. Was the plaintiffs negligence a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries? Yes. 
5. If you have answered both Questions 1 and 4 'Yes,' then, and only then, answer the 
following question: Assuming all the negligence that proximately caused the 
plaintiffs injuries to total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable 
to: 
A. Plaintiff, 10% 
B. Defendant, 90% 
If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 'Yes,', state the amount of special and 
general damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries 
complained of. If such questions were not answered 'yes,' do not answer this question. 
Special Damages: 
A. Past Special Damages $2,100.00 
B. Future Special Damages $0 
General Damages $2,200.00 
Total: $4,300.00 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff failed to meet the threshold 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) and, therefore, the Court hereby enters a 
Judgment of No Cause of Action against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant, O. Stewart Pierce. The 
Court further orders that Defendant has no obligation to pay Plaintiff any of the damages awarded 
and that the matter is hereby dismissed with prejudice 
DATED this J_ day of -feuiuary, 2004. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ff day of January, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document, postage prepaid to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Robert C. Cummings 
Gorgon Madson 
225 South 200 E., Ste. 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
y ^ U p g ^ . BURT 
DOCUMENT 3 
BRUCE C. BURT, USB NO. 8453 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
215 South State Street, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENDA J. MARSHALL, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
0. STEWART PIERCE, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
1 Civil No. 020908282 
1 Judge Anthony Quinn 
Following the jury verdict that was rendered on January 8,2004 Defendant filed a Motion for 
Entry of Judgment and asked the Court to enter a judgment of "no cause of action" against Plaintiff. 
That motion was fully briefed and the Court signed the Judgment of No Cause of Action on February 
9,2004. At about the same time the Motion for Entry of Judgment was filed, Plaintiffs counsel filed 
a separate Motion for New Trial. The Motion for New Trial was fully briefed by both parties and oral 
argument was held on March 23, 2004. Having considered all trial testimony and evidence, the 
memoranda, arguments of counsel and for good cause appearing the Court hereby enters the 
following ORDER: 
FILIO ©SSTHfe? COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 7 2004 
SALT LAKE COUj 
By _ _ 
Deputy Clerk" 
1. Plaintiff s Motion for New Trial is denied. The jury verdict was well supported by the 
evidence. There is no basis for a finding of passion or prejudice. 
The Court hereby enters the following findings pursuant to Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure: 
1. The Court is convinced, based in part on the fact that the jury did not award future 
special damages, that the jury accepted Dr. Jeffrey Chung's opinion that the auto accident caused a 
temporary exacerbation of a pre-existing condition which exacerbation resolved within a few months 
and that on or about December 17,1998 she had returned to her pre-auto accident baseline condition. 
The Court finds that the jury accepted the first of Dr. Chung's options - that is she had a temporary 
exacerbation of a pre-existing condition and that the medical care related to that exacerbation lasted 
from the date of the auto accident until approximately December 17,1998. This finding is consistent 
with the jury's verdict and the greater weight of the evidence presented at trial. 
2. The auto accident did not cause a permanent impairment. 
3. There was no permanent impairment based upon objective findings. There is no 
objective test for myofascial pain. The diagnosis of myofascial pain is based entirely on the patient's 
self report of pain. 
4. The Court is convinced that Plaintiffs condition is permanent but is also convinced 
that it is not permanent because of the auto accident. The condition was permanent before the auto 
accident. 
2 
th / 
DATED this ^ / d a y of April, 2004 
3 
DOCUMENT 4 
GORDON A. MADSEN, #2048
 ;. , ...-../, 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777 
Attorneys for the Plair}tiff.': f; j 
225 South 200 East, #150 
IN THE THIRD^J^ro^jQIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENDA J. MARSHALL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
O. STEWART PIERCE, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
AND PROPOSED VERDICT 
Civil No. 020908282 
Judge: Anthony B. Quinn 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the following Jury 
Instructions, Numbered 1 to f(# , both inclusive, be given at 
the trial of this action. Plaintiff's requested jury Verdict form 
is also submitted herewith. 
Dated this -2, ( day of December, 2003. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
rl^L/W^ 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
y 
Copy of the foregoing delivered to Bruce C. Burt at his 
address, 215 So. State, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
*3 / day of December, 2003. 
dj a 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
INSTRUCTION NO. /t 
The driver of a vehicle turning left must yield to 
vehicles close enough to represent an immediate hazard. However, 
a driver is not compelled to remain in an intersection indefinitely 
waiting to turn. The driver must make reasonable observations and 
yield when reasonably necessary. 
When a driver is turning left across more than one lane 
of oncoming traffic and another driver in one lane of such oncoming 
traffic stops to allow such left-turning driver to proceed, this 
does not give such left-turning driver the right to assume that 
drivers in the remaining oncoming lanes will also stop and yield 
their right-of-way, and does not relieve such left-turning driver 
of the duty to make reasonable observations and yield in such other 
oncoming lanes when reasonably necessary. 
1st paragraph MUJI 5.17 
r 
INSTRUCTION NO. * ^  
A person who has a latent, dormant or asymptomatic 
condition, or a condition to which the person is predisposed, may 
recover the full amount of damages that proximately result from 
injuries that aggravate the condition. In other words, when a 
latent condition does not cause pain, but that condition plus the 
injury brings on pain by aggravating the preexisting, dormant or 
asymptomatic condition, then it is the injury, not the dormant or 
asymptomatic condition, that is the proximate cause of pain and 
disability. 
MUJI 27.7 
INSTRUCTION NO. * & 
According to the mortality tables, the expectancy of life 
of a black female aged 54 years is 25.3 years. 
This fact, which is now in evidence, is to be considered 
by you in arriving at the amount of damages sustained by the 
plaintiff. 
Life expectancy shown by the mortality tables is merely 
an estimate of the probable average remaining length of life of all 
persons in our country of a given age. The inference that may be 
drawn from the tables applies only to one who has the average 
health and exposure to danger of people of that age. Thus, in 
connection with this evidence, you should consider all other 
evidence bearing on the same issue, such as that pertaining to the 
occupation, health, habits and activities of the person whose life 
expectancy is in question. 
MUJI 27.12 
DOCUMENT 5 
DAMAGES 27.6 
MUJI 27.6 
AGGRAVATION OF PREEXISTING CONDITIONS 
(Alternate A) 
A person who has a condition or disability at the time of an 
injury is not entitled to recover damages for that condition or 
disability. However, the injured person is entitled to recover 
damages for any aggravation of such preexisting condition or 
disability proximately resulting from the injury. 
This is true even if the person's condition or disability made the 
injured person more susceptible to the possibility of ill-effects than 
a normally healthy person would have been, and even if a normally 
healthy person probably would not have suffered any substantial 
injury. 
When a preexisting condition or disability is aggravated, 
damages for the condition or disability are limited to the 
additional injury caused by the aggravation. 
Comments 
Alternate Instruction A reflects the holding of the Utah Supreme Court 
in Branson v. Strong, (cited below). The Court did not specifically address 
the issue of dormant and asymptomatic conditions. Alternate Instruction B 
reflects the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals in Biswell v. Duncan (cited 
below), where the plaintiff claimed that the preexisting condition was 
dormant or asymptomatic. Modification of the instruction may be necessary 
based upon the evidence in any given case. 
References: 
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah 1987) 
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966) 
BAJI No. 14.65 (Supp. 1992). Reprinted with permission; copyright ® 
1986 West Publishing Company 
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27.7 MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL 
MUJI 27.7 
AGGRAVATION OF PREEXISTING CONDITIONS 
(Alternate B) 
A person who has a latent, dormant or ^symptomatic condition, 
or a condition to which the person is predisposed, may recover the 
full amount of damages that proximately result from injuries that 
aggravate the condition. In other words, when a latent condition 
does not cause pain, but that condition plus the injury brings on 
pain by aggravating the preexisting, dormant or asymptomatic 
condition, then it is the injury, not the dormant or asymptomatic 
condition, that is the proximate cause of pain and disability. 
References: 
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah 1987) 
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DOCUMENT 6 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 7 
If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant, then it is your duty to award the plaintiff such 
damages, if any, that you find, from a preponderance of the 
evidence, will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for 
the injury and damage sustained. 
iw 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In awarding such damages, you may consider any pain, 
discomfort, and suffering, both mental and physical, its probable 
duration and severity, and the extent to which the plaintiff has 
been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as 
previously enjoyed. You may also consider whether any of the above 
will, with reasonable certainty, continue in the future. If so, 
you may award such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the 
plaintiff for them. 
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by 
law to fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is 
the opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such 
reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel as 
to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable 
compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, you shall 
exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the 
damages you fix shall be just and reasonable in light of the 
evidence. 
DOCUMENT 7 
APPENDIX 1 
Dr. Petron's records (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1) disclose: 
A. Dr. Petron's records of September 22, 1998, state: "Objective: On exam she is diffusely 
tender..." (Emphasis added.) 
B. Dr. Petron's records of October 19, 1998: "Objective: On exam she has full ROM in 
her neck, diffuse pain along the left parathoracic area." (Emphasis added.) 
C. Dr. Petron's records of October 12, 1998: "Objective: On exam today she still 
has some tenderness in the thoracic back and tender trigger points." (Emphasis added.) 
D. Dr. Petron's records of December 17, 1998: "Objective: On exam she has full 
ROM in her neck. She has some tenderness along the levator scapula right and left..." 
E. Dr. Petron's records of November 11, 1998: "Objective: On exam today she has 
fijll ROM in her neck. She has tenderness primarily along the left parascapular and cervical area." 
(Emphasis added.) 
F. Dr. Petron's records of April 14, 1999: "Objective: On exam there is tenderness 
in the trapezius region and along the levator scapula..." (Emphasis added.) 
G. Dr. Petron's records of May 25, 1999: "Objective: On exam she has tenderness 
along the parspinal processes, some tenderness in the trapezius..." (Emphasis added.) 
H. Dr. Petron's records of March 2, 2000: "Objective. On exam she has some 
paracervical tenderness, negative NV exam of the upper extremities. She has mainly pain along the 
upper trapezius." (Emphasis added.) 
I. Dr. Petron's records of May 17, 2000: "Objective. On exam she has some 
tenderness in the upper thoracic region, no point specific pain, negative NV, some limitation of 
am 
motion both thoracic and cervical spine, but primarily seems to be myofascial in nature.11 
J. Dr. Petron's records of October 9, 2000" "With side bending it was difficult to the 
left...Strength was equal bilaterally, though somewhat decreased with plantar flexion bilaterally." 
(Emphasis added.) 
K. Dr. Petronfs report of November 9, 2000: "Objective: On exam... She has several 
tender and trigger points." (Emphasis added.) 
L. Report of physical therapist Teresa Hall of September 23, 1998 (per referral from 
Dr. Petron).(Plaintiffs Exhibit 1): The patient demonstrates 50% limitation in thoracic flexion due 
to complaints of pain along the left paraspinous. Active standing lumbar range of motion is limited 
25% in the left side bending with slight low back pain. Right side bending increases paid along the 
left low back area, although motion is within normal limits. Standing flexion and extension are within 
normal limits and the patient has increasing pain when returning to stand from a bent over position." 
